In 2008, then-Commissioner Paul S. Atkins co-authored, “Evaluating the Mission: A Critical Review of the History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program,” a sustained critique of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) enforcement practices.[1] The article advanced a set of principles—due process, legal clarity, and disciplined use of enforcement authority—that, in the authors’ thesis, should define the proper scope of the Enforcement Division.
Nearly two decades later, Atkins now leads the Commission as Chairman of the SEC. His tenure has been marked by a series of policy choices, public statements, and institutional adjustments that invite comparison to that earlier framework. These developments include refinements to the Wells process, a reconsideration of how enforcement outcomes are structured, a diminished emphasis on enforcement metrics, and a repeated rejection of “regulation by enforcement” as a governing approach.
This article argues that these developments are not episodic. Rather, they reflect a coherent effort to realign SEC enforcement with principles articulated in Evaluating the Mission. From his earliest remarks to Commission staff through subsequent public statements, Chairman Atkins has consistently emphasized due process, legal restraint, and institutional discipline. While implementation has not been without tension, the trajectory of the Commission’s enforcement program suggests a deliberate effort to translate longstanding critique into operational policy.
I. The 2008 Framework
Evaluating the Mission was, at its core, a critique of a perceived institutional drift. It argued that SEC enforcement had moved away from foundational principles, influenced in part by internal incentives and an expanding conception of the Enforcement Division’s role.
The article emphasized that enforcement must be grounded in “predictability, fairness, and transparency, culminating in the rule of law.”[2] It cautioned against the use of enforcement actions as a substitute for rulemaking, noting that “law making is reserved for legislative process… it is not a function of the Enforcement Division.”[3]
It also identified structural incentives as a source of distortion. Reliance on quantitative metrics—such as case counts and penalties—risked influencing enforcement decisions in ways inconsistent with the Commission’s mission. Accordingly, the authors recommended that such statistics “play only a minimal role” in evaluating enforcement performance.[4]
These concerns were not abstract. The article described an enforcement environment in which procedural opacity, expansive legal theories, and output-driven incentives risked undermining both fairness and legitimacy.
The institutional continuity underlying this framework warrants brief note. In addition to Atkins and his co-author, Bradley J. Bondi, the article reflects contributions from individuals who would later occupy senior roles in securities regulation. Among those acknowledged for their “advice and significant contributions” were Hester M. Peirce and Mark T. Uyeda, both of whom now serve alongside Chairman Atkins as Commissioners.[5] This overlap suggests that the framework articulated in Evaluating the Mission reflected a broader intellectual perspective regarding the proper role of enforcement that has persisted within the Commission’s current leadership.
II. Due Process as an Institutional Priority
Turning to present day, Chairman Atkins’ earliest remarks upon returning to the Commission placed due process at the center of his enforcement philosophy. In his first address to SEC staff, he emphasized that “[p]redictability, due process, rule of law, [and] integrity” are essential to ensuring that market participants receive “a fair shake without vindictiveness or ulterior motives.”[6]
Notably, these themes were articulated at the outset of Chairman Atkins’ tenure, before the implementation of substantive policy reforms, suggesting that they reflect an intentional starting point rather than a retrospective justification.
This articulation closely tracks the principles identified in “Evaluating the Mission.” The continuity is not merely conceptual. It is reflected in operational changes to enforcement practice, particularly in the Wells process. Under Chairman Atkins, the Commission has placed greater emphasis on providing respondents with, in the SEC’s view, more sufficient information and time to respond to potential charges—an approach that may be seen as signaling that procedural rights are meaningful rather than formal.
The significance of these developments lies in their institutional character. SEC leadership is seeking to signal that due process is not treated as an abstract value, but as a principle embedded in the mechanics of enforcement.
III. Enforcement Outcomes and Institutional Fairness
A second area of alignment concerns the structure of enforcement outcomes. The Commission has adopted a policy of considering settlements and related waiver requests simultaneously, allowing for a more comprehensive assessment of the consequences of enforcement actions[7].
This approach reflects a broader conception of fairness—one that extends beyond the determination of liability to include collateral consequences. While “Evaluating the Mission” did not prescribe specific procedural reforms, its emphasis on fairness and proportionality provides a clear foundation for such changes.
By consolidating these decisions, the Commission aims to reduce fragmentation and enhances the coherence of enforcement outcomes. In doing so, it reinforces their perspective on a more disciplined and transparent enforcement process.
IV. Incentives, Metrics, and Enforcement Discipline
The most direct line of continuity between the 2008 framework and current practice concerns the role of incentives in shaping enforcement behavior.
In “Evaluating the Mission,” Atkins warned that metrics such as case counts and penalties distort enforcement priorities.[8] That concern has reemerged as a central theme of Chairman Atkins’ tenure. In public remarks, he has emphasized that enforcement should move away from “approaches that measure success by volume over real investor protection.”
This concern is reflected in Chairman Atkins’ broader statements regarding institutional incentives. As he has observed, “you get what you measure,[9]” underscoring the extent to which internal metrics can shape enforcement behavior and, in turn, influence the types of cases that are pursued.
Institutional behavior further supports this shift. The Commission’s decision not to publish annual enforcement statistics for fiscal year 2025 represents a departure from longstanding practice. While the absence of such data may have multiple explanations, it is consistent with an effort to reduce the prominence—and influence—of quantitative metrics.
The implications are consequential. By de-emphasizing numerical outputs, the Commission may be recalibrating internal incentives toward more selective and substantively grounded case selection. At the same time, this approach introduces tension with traditional expectations of transparency, as enforcement statistics have historically served as a mechanism for public accountability.
V. The Rejection of Regulation by Enforcement
Perhaps the clearest area of alignment between the 2008 framework and current policy is the rejection of “regulation by enforcement.” In his 2026 remarks at SEC Speaks, Chairman Atkins described prior regulatory approaches as a “misguided regulation-by-enforcement campaign” that “killed many would-be products or driven them offshore.”[10]
This critique closely tracks the concerns raised in “Evaluating the Mission,” which warned against the use of enforcement actions to develop legal standards.[11] The continuity is both conceptual and practical. Chairman Atkins has emphasized that enforcement should remain grounded in established legal principles, rather than extending the boundaries of existing law.
The Commission’s evolving approach to digital assets illustrates this dynamic. In this respect, the agency’s prior reliance on enforcement serves not merely as an example, but as a case study in the limitations of enforcement-driven regulatory development. Rather than continuing that approach, the Commission has signaled an intention to develop clearer regulatory pathways.
VI. Selectivity and the Purpose of Enforcement
A related development is the Commission’s increasing emphasis on selectivity in enforcement. Chairman Atkins has directed enforcement staff to prioritize cases involving “fraud, market manipulation, and abuses of trust,” while moving away from technical violations that do not result in investor harm.[12]
This shift reflects a reorientation of enforcement toward core misconduct. It also reinforces the move away from volume-based measures of success, emphasizing instead the substantive impact of enforcement actions.
In his remarks to staff, Chairman Atkins described enforcement as a tool to “cure and rectify wayward actions,” rather than an end in itself.[13] This framing reflects a conception of enforcement that is corrective rather than expansive, emphasizing remediation over signaling.
VII. Implementation and Institutional Tension
The implementation of these principles has not been without challenge. Changes in enforcement leadership and reported disagreements regarding enforcement priorities illustrate the difficulty of translating broad principles into operational practice.
Such developments are not unexpected. As “Evaluating the Mission” recognized, enforcement decisions inherently involve “a balancing of competing interests.”[14] Differences in judgment regarding selectivity, deterrence, and resource allocation are likely to arise, even among those who share a common framework. These disagreements appear to reflect not a rejection of these principles, but differing views as to how they should be operationalized in practice.
VIII. The A-C-T Framework as a Modern Expression of the 2008 Philosophy
Chairman Atkins’ 2026 SEC Speaks remarks introduced a unifying framework for the Commission’s policy agenda: to advance, clarify, and transform its regulatory regime.[15] While forward-looking in presentation, the framework reflects many of the concerns articulated in “Evaluating the Mission.”
To advance is to align regulation with modern markets, rather than relying on enforcement to fill gaps. To clarify is to establish clear regulatory boundaries, reducing reliance on enforcement-driven interpretation. To transform is to eliminate unnecessary burdens and refocus on materiality and meaningful investor protection.
Within this structure, enforcement is repositioned as a mechanism for policing clear violations, rather than a tool for defining regulatory boundaries. It is directed toward misconduct that causes real investor harm and away from technical violations and volume-based measures of success.[16] In this respect, the A-C-T framework may be understood as a modern operational expression of the principles articulated in 2008.
Conclusion
The evolution of SEC enforcement under Chairman Atkins reflects a notable degree of continuity with the framework set forth in “Evaluating the Mission.” The emphasis on due process, legal clarity, and disciplined enforcement is evident not only in rhetoric, but in institutional practice.
At the same time, the challenges of implementation remain. Enforcement policy is shaped by competing priorities, institutional constraints, and differing judgments about how best to achieve the Commission’s mission.
Taken together, these developments suggest not only a shift in enforcement policy, but an effort to realign the institutional culture that shapes how enforcement decisions are made.
If fully realized, the current approach may produce an enforcement program defined less by the number of actions brought and more by the discipline with which those actions are selected and pursued. Such a shift would not diminish the role of enforcement but would recalibrate how its effectiveness is understood.
This article originally appeared on NYU’s PCCE Blog.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of StoneTurn Group, LLP, Province, LLC, or their affiliates. This article is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal, financial, or other professional advice.
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[1] Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A Critical Review of the History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 367 (2008).
[2] Id. at 390.
[3] Id. at 391.
[4] Id. at 420.
[5] Id. at 367 n.*.
[6] Paul S. Atkins, Opening Remarks at SEC Town Hall (May 6, 2025).
[7] Evaluating the Mission, supra note 1, at 420.
[8] Paul S. Atkins, Prepared Remarks Before SEC Speaks (Mar. 19, 2026).
[9] Paul S. Atkins, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Keynote Address at the 25th Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities, and Financial Law (Fordham University School of Law, Oct. 7, 2025).
[10] Id.
[11] Evaluating the Mission, supra note 1, at 391.
[12] Atkins, SEC Speaks Remarks, supra note 8.
[13] Atkins, Town Hall Remarks, supra note 6.
[14] 13 Evaluating the Mission, supra note 1, at 384.
[15] Atkins, SEC Speaks Remarks, supra note 8.
[16] Id
